Colonial Legacies and Their Impact on South Asian Political Institutions

Abstract

This article examines how colonial administrative repertoires shaped the trajectories of political institutions in South Asia—particularly India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—from the late nineteenth century to the present. We argue that three features of British imperial governance produced persistent legacies: (1) the legal transplantation of common law and codified procedures; (2) bureaucratic centralization embodied in the Indian Civil Service and its successors; and (3) segmented sovereignty through indirect rule, communal electorates, and emergency powers. Drawing on comparative-historical analysis and secondary literature, we trace the ways in which these legacies influenced constitutional design, center–state relations, party systems, civil–military relations, and judicial autonomy after decolonization. India combined legal continuity with democratic consolidation under a quasi-federal constitution, yet inherited administrative centralism and broad executive ordinance powers. Pakistan and Bangladesh, inheriting similar legal-bureaucratic apparatuses, experienced greater civil–military contestation, periodic constitutional suspensions, and executive-dominant governance. Sri Lanka retained Westminster forms but diverged via majoritarian presidentialism. We conclude that the endurance of colonial-era rules-in-use depends on postcolonial political coalitions, security dilemmas, and social mobilization, not merely legal continuity. The analysis clarifies why similar colonial origins produced divergent institutional equilibria across South Asia and underscores the need to reform executive emergency provisions, strengthen subnational fiscal capacity, and deepen judicial independence.